(ii) Analyse why moving to a ‘no frills’ low－cost strategy would be inappropriate for ONA.

Question

(ii) Analyse why moving to a ‘no frills’ low-cost strategy would be inappropriate for ONA.

Note: requirement (b) (ii) includes 3 professional marks (16 marks)

Answer 1

正确答案：
(ii) ‘No frills’ low-cost budget airlines are usually associated with the following characteristics. Each of these characteristics
is considered in the context of Oceania National Airlines (ONA).
– Operational economies of scale
Increased flight frequency brings operational economies and is attractive to both business and leisure travellers. In
the international sector where ONA is currently experiencing competition from established ‘no frills’ low-cost budget
airlines ONA has, on average, one flight per day to each city. It would have to greatly extend its flight network, flight
frequency and the size of its aircraft fleet if it planned to become a ‘no frills’ carrier in this sector. This fleet
expansion appears counter to the culture of an organisation that has expanded very gradually since its formation.
Table 1 shows only three aircraft added to the fleet in the period 2004–2006. It is likely that the fleet size would
have to double for ONA to become a serious ‘no frills’ operator in the international sector. In the regional sector, the
flight density, an average of three flights per day, is more characteristic of a ‘no frills’ airline. However, ONA would
have to address the relatively low utilisation of its aircraft (see Tables 1 and 2) and the cost of maintenance
associated with a relatively old fleet of aircraft.
– Reduced costs through direct sales
On-line booking is primarily aimed at eliminating commission sales (usually made through travel agents). ‘No frills’
low-cost budget airlines typically achieve over 80% of their sales on-line. The comparative figure for ONA (see
Table 2) is 40% for regional sales and 60% for international sales, compared with an average of 84% for their
competitors. Clearly a major change in selling channels would have to take place for ONA to become a ‘no frills’
low-cost budget airline. It is difficult to know whether this is possible. The low percentage of regional on-line sales
seems to suggest that the citizens of Oceania may be more comfortable buying through third parties such as travel
agents.
– Reduced customer service
‘No frills’ low-cost budget airlines usually do not offer customer services such as free meals, free drinks and the
allocation of passengers to specific seats. ONA prides itself on its in-flight customer service and this was one of the
major factors that led to its accolade as Regional Airline of the Year. To move to a ‘no frills’ strategy, ONA would
have to abandon a long held tradition of excellent customer service. This would require a major cultural change
within the organisation. It would also probably lead to disbanding the award winning (Golden Bowl) catering
department and the redundancies of catering staff could prove difficult to implement in a heavily unionised
organisation.
Johnson, Scholes and Whittington have suggested that if an organisation is to ‘achieve competitive advantage through
a low price strategy then it has two basic choices. The first is to try and identify a market segment which is unattractive
(or inaccessible) to competitors and in this way avoid competitive pressures to erode price.’ It is not possible for ONA to
pursue this policy in the international sector because of significant competition from established continental ‘no frills’
low-cost budget airlines. It may be a candidate strategy for the regional sector, but the emergence of small ‘no frills’ lowcost
budget airlines in these countries threaten this. Many of these airlines enter the market with very low overheads
and use the ‘no frills’ approach as a strategy to gain market share before progressing to alternative strategies.
Secondly, a ‘no frills’ strategy depends for its success on margin. Johnson, Scholes and Whittington suggest that ‘in the
long run, a low price strategy cannot be pursued without a low-cost base’. Evidence from the scenario suggests that ONA
does not have a low cost base. It continues to maintain overheads (such as a catering department) that its competitors
have either disbanded or outsourced. More fundamentally (from Table 2), its flight crew enjoy above average wages and
the whole company is heavily unionised. The scenario acknowledges that the company pays above industry salaries and
offers excellent benefits such as a generous non-contributory pension. Aircraft utilisation and aircraft age also suggest a
relatively high cost base. The aircraft are older than their competitors and presumably incur greater maintenance costs.
ONA’s utilisation of its aircraft is also lower than its competitors. It seems highly unlikely that ONA can achieve the
changes required in culture, cost base and operations required for it to become a ‘no frills’ low-cost budget airline. Other
factors serve to reinforce this. For example:
– Many ‘no frills’ low-cost budget airlines fly into airports that offer cheaper taking off and landing fees. Many of these
airports are relatively remote from the cities they serve. This may be acceptable to leisure travellers, but not to
business travellers – ONA’s primary market in the regional sector.
– Most ‘no frills’ low-cost budget airlines have a standardised fleet leading to commonality and familiarity in
maintenance. Although ONA has a relatively small fleet it is split between three aircraft types. This is due to
historical reasons. The Boeing 737s and Airbus A320s appear to be very similar aircraft. However, the Boeings
were inherited from OceaniaAir and the Airbuses from Transport Oceania.
In conclusion, the CEO’s decision to reject a ‘no frills’ strategy for ONA appears to be justifiable. It would require major
changes in structure, cost and culture that would be difficult to justify given ONA’s current position. Revolution is the
term used by Baligan and Hope to describe a major rapid strategic change. It is associated with a sudden transformation
required to react to extreme pressures on the organisation. Such an approach is often required when the company is
facing a crisis and needs to quickly change direction. There is no evidence to support the need for a radical
transformation. This is why the CEO brands the change to a ‘no frills’ low-cost budget airline as ‘unnecessary’. The
financial situation (Table 3) is still relatively healthy and there is no evidence of corporate predators. It can be argued
that a more incremental approach to change would be beneficial, building on the strengths of the organisation and the
competencies of its employees. Moving ONA to a ‘no frills’ model would require seismic changes in cost and culture. If
ONA really wanted to move into this sector then they would be better advised to start afresh with a separate brand andairline and to concentrate on the regional sector where it has a head start over many of its competitors.