In January 2008 Arti entered in a contractual agreement with Bee Ltd to write a study manu

Question

In January 2008 Arti entered in a contractual agreement with Bee Ltd to write a study manual for an international accountancy body’s award. The manual was to cover the period from September 2008 till June 2009, and it was a term of the contract that the text be supplied by 30 June 2008 so that it could be printed in time for September. By 30 May, Arti had not yet started on the text and indeed he had written to Bee Ltd stating that he was too busy to write the text.

Bee Ltd was extremely perturbed by the news, especially as it had acquired the contract to supply all of the

accountancy body’s study manuals and had already incurred extensive preliminary expenses in relation to the publication of the new manual.

Required:

In the context of the law of contract, advise Bee Ltd whether they can take any action against Arti.

(10 marks)

Answer 1

正确答案：

The essential issues to be disentangled from the problem scenario relate to breach of contract and the remedies available for such breach.
There seems to be no doubt that there is a contractual agreement between Arti and Bee Ltd. Normally breach of a contract occurs where one of the parties to the agreement fails to comply, either completely or satisfactorily, with their obligations under it. However, such a definition does not appear to apply in this case as the time has not yet come when Arti has to produce the text. He has merely indicated that he has no intention of doing so. This is an example of the operation of the doctrine of anticipatory breach.
This arises precisely where one party, prior to the actual due date of performance, demonstrates an intention not to perform. their contractual obligations. The intention not to fulfil the contract can be either express or implied.
Express anticipatory breach occurs where a party actually states that they will not perform. their contractual obligations (Hochster v De La Tour (1853)). Implied anticipatory breach occurs where a party carries out some act which makes performance impossible
Omnium Enterprises v Sutherland (1919)).
When anticipatory breach takes place the innocent party can sue for damages immediately on receipt of the notification of the other party’s intention to repudiate the contract, without waiting for the actual contractual date of performance as in Hochster v De La Tour. Alternatively, they can wait until the actual time for performance before taking action. In the latter instance, they are entitled to make preparations for performance, and claim the agreed contract price (White and Carter (Councils) v McGregor (1961)).
It would appear that Arti’s action is clearly an instance of express anticipatory breach and that Bee Ltd has the right either to accept the repudiation immediately or affirm the contract and take action against Arti at the time for performance (Vitol SA v Norelf Ltd (1996)). In any event Arti is bound to complete his contractual promise or suffer the consequences of his breach of contract.
Remedies for breach of contract

(i) Specific performance It will sometimes suit a party to break their contractual obligations, even if they have to pay damages. In such circumstances the court can make an order for specific performance to require the party in breach to complete their part of the contract. However, as specific performance is not available in respect of contracts of employment or personal service Arti cannot be legally required to write the book for Bee Ltd (Ryan v Mutual Tontine Westminster Chambers Association (1893)). This means that the only remedy against Arti lies in the award of damages.
(ii) Damages A breach of contract will result in the innocent party being able to sue for damages.
Bee Ltd, therefore, can sue Bob for damages, but the important issue relates to the extent of such damages.
The estimation of what damages are to be paid by a party in breach of contract can be divided into two parts: remoteness and measure.
Remoteness of damage
The rule in Hadley v Baxendale (1845) states that damages will only be awarded in respect of losses which arise naturally, or which both parties may reasonably be supposed to have contemplated when the contract was made, as a probable result of its breach.

The effect of the first part of the rule in Hadley v Baxendale is that the party in breach is deemed to expect the normal consequences of the breach, whether they actually expected them or not. Under the second part of the rule, however, the party in breach can only be held liable for abnormal consequences where they have actual knowledge that the abnormal consequences might follow (Victoria Laundry Ltd v Newham Industries Ltd (1949)).

Measure of damages
Damages in contract are intended to compensate an injured party for any financial loss sustained as a consequence of another party’s breach. The object is not to punish the party in breach, so the amount of damages awarded can never be greater than the actual loss suffered. The aim is to put the injured party in the same position they would have been in had the contract been properly performed. In order to achieve this end the claimant is placed under a duty to mitigate losses. This means that the injured party has to take all reasonable steps to minimise their loss (Payzu v Saunders (1919)). Although such a duty did not appear to apply in relation to anticipatory breach as decided in White and Carter (Councils) v McGregor (1961)(above).
Applying these rules to the fact situation in the problem it is evident that as Arti has effected an anticipatory breach of his contract with Bee Ltd he will be liable to them for damages suffered as a consequence, if indeed they suffer damage as a result of his breach. As Bee Ltd will be under a duty to mitigate their losses, they will have to commit their best endeavours to find someone else to produce the required text on time. If they can do so at no further cost then they would suffer no loss, but any additional costs in producing the text will have to be borne by Arti.
However, if Bee Ltd is unable to produce the required text on time the situation becomes more complicated.
(i) As regards the profits from the contract to supply the accountancy body with all its text, the issue would be as to whether this was normal profit or amounted to an unexpected gain, as it was not part of Bee Ltd’s normal market when the contract was signed. If Victoria Laundry Ltd v Newham Industries Ltd were to be applied it is unlikely that Bee Ltd would be able to claim that loss of profit from Arti. However, it is equally plausible that the contract was an ordinary commercial one and that Arti would have to recompense Bee Ltd for any losses suffered from its failure to complete contractual performance.
(ii) As for the extensive preliminary expenses Arti would certainly be liable for them, as long as they were in the ordinary course of Bee Ltd’s business and were not excessive (Anglia Television v Reed (1972)).